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Abstract
Due to bounded rationality, human beings have turned to market and bureaucracy because of
their capability to manage information. Do the proliferation of the internet and of information
technology, as instruments for processing information, lead to new organizational forms other
than market and bureaucracy? Peer production can be considered in this regard and under
specific conditions results even more effective for managing information.
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From bureaucracy to peer production: organizations as informationprocessing networks
Andrea Resca
Cersi-Luiss “Guido Carli” University, Rome
aresca@luiss.it
The perspective at the basis of this paper consider individuals at the centre of the stage. The focus is
posed on them and their actions rather than on roles, procedures, processes, organizational charts,
etc. Following Simon, “it is only because individual human beings are limited in knowledge,
foresight, skill, and time that organizations are useful instruments for the achievement of human
purpose….” (1957, pp. 199). In this regard, the question at stake concerns solutions that individuals
have at disposal in order to deal with these limits and market and bureaucracy are the two main
devices that have been figured out. Why? Due to their capacity to manage information (Williamson,
1985; Galbraith, 1973). At the basis of this statement, there is the idea that “as the degree of
uncertainty increases, the amount of information processing during task execution increases”
(Galbraith, 1973 pp. 9). If the task to be executed is simple, personal skills and capabilities are
sufficient in order to face them. It is not the same if the task is complex. At this point, as suggested
by Galbraith (1973), a solution is to follow specific rules or procedures in which the task can be
subdivided into subtasks and necessary behaviours are specified in advanced. The subtasks can be
assigned to different individuals who collaborate with each other in the task execution. The
collaboration can acquire several modalities. One of them is represented by the hierarchy. When
rules and procedures encounter an unexpected situation a new response has to be devised and a
superordinate role in charge of exceptions can be an answer in this regard. Hierarchies are not only
instruments to manage different levels of information but also to manage authority and reward
power that contribute significantly to the behaviours of task performers. In case of an elevate
number of exceptions executing tasks, the vertical channel risks to collapse. Superordinated roles
becomes overloaded and task execution suffers this situation. The introduction of a divisional
structure, lateral relations among the different divisions, and teamwork etc. contribute to outline
more capable information processing networks.
So far, modalities through which products or services can be made or provided have been taken into
consideration. But, in our societies, products and services can be bought as well. It will not be
object of the present work to examine in detail when it is preferable the make solution or when, on
the contrary, it is preferable the buy solution. Here, the point is to see market as an information
processor based on prices. Following Hayek (1952), subjects, because of a spontaneous order,
succeed to coordinate each other even if it is not the result of their deliberate decision. This is
possible because the market mechanism permit to collect information and knowledge that are
fragmented and diffused among subjects and concentrate them into prices. Prices, in fact, are the
final result of a process in which entrepreneurs compare their production costs with each other in
order to allure customers and gain a profit. Therefore they represent both the ability of
entrepreneurs to combine the production factors and to satisfy, at the same time, customers’ needs.
Information processing, in the case of bureaucracy, is due to norms and procedures applied in an
environment characterized by role differentiation according to a hierarchical order. In the case of
market, information processing leads to the price system that governs economic actors.
Transaction costs approach scholars have determined further forms for governing transactions apart
from market and bureaucracy. Ouchi (1980) added clan as the organizational form that emerge in
presence of an high level of trust and shared values among organizational actors. Boisot (1995)
added an additional form: fief. Fief, simplifying, characterizes organizational contexts in which
traditional forms of authority rather than the legal-rational one typical of bureaucracy prevail.
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The development of information technology has constituted an opportunity for the production and
the spread of information. In this regard, from the half of the ’90, the term information society is
normally in use to define advanced societies. The question, now, is to see if this phenomenon can
also lead to new devices in order to deal with human beings’ inherent limits in knowledge,
foresight, skill, and time. Peer production can be seen in this respect (Benkler, 2002). More
precisely, Benkler (2002) maintains that four attributes constitute the basis of this new form for
managing information: 1) information is a nonrival good (its consumption does not diminish its
availability for use by any other person; 2) the physical capital costs of information production have
declined dramatically; 3) individuals’ creative talent is highly variable and need specific situations
in order to be exploited appropriately. Only individuals themselves are aware about this and about
motivations that lead them; 4) communication and information exchange across space and time are
much cheaper and more efficient than ever before. According to the combination of these four
attributes it is possible to obtain both information gains and allocation gains in comparison with
other forms of governance like market and bureaucracy.
Let’s start from information gains. According to market principles, individuals decide to provide
their workforce in exchange for a salary. However, the salary is only a suboptimal indicator of
efforts and talent dedicated by a specific individual to a specific range of actions as it is determined
by a series of factors out of the individual’s control. The salary is a price and as such is subject to
market forces and not only to his/her contractual capability. Further, once the individual is
employed in a specific organization, he/she has to follow assigned instructions in order to execute a
specific task. It goes without saying that rules and regulations are constraints to the potential efforts
of an individual. In other words, market and bureaucracy establish bonds to information spread and
to what could have been done with the same amount of resources. Peer production is not
characterized by these bonds. If information production is cheap and information resources are
freely available it is no more necessary to turn to “information-compression mechanisms like prices
or managerial instructions” (Benkler, 2002, pp. 413). Of course, it is necessary that a large number
of agents are involved in the same resources and opportunity set in order to create those conditions
(information production) that allow to any agent to fit in with what can be done. Equally important
is an effective communication platform that supports peer production processes. What is crucial is
the design of the platform and modalities through which information exchanges are managed.
Human beings are in charge of the latter and with the former constitute transaction costs of peer
production organizational forms. In this regard and given the availability of opportunity for action
by any agent, it is important to put under control undermining actions. Actions that usually are
related to incompetence, incorrect self-assessment and defection. Therefore, it is under these
conditions that “information production will better identify who is the best person to produce a
specific component of a project” (Benkler, 2002, pp. 414) for example.
Moving from information gains to allocation gains of peer production means to focus on the
combination of factors of production (resources, agents and projects). Market and bureaucracy are
bounded by contracts and property rights. Resources and agents are available only through these
instruments and it is intuitive the difficulty to mobilize these factors. In the case of peer production
is not like this: “unbounded set of resources (are) available to unbounded set of agents, who can
apply themselves to unbounded set of projects” (Benkler, 2002, pp. 415). In is in these conditions
that there could verify an higher probability of superior productivity.
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